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Comment 
Toward Postmodern Risk Analysis’ 
Roy A. Rappaport2 
I am a stranger to risk analysis, having wandered 
into its territory from anthropology by way of Yucca 
Mountain, Nevada, where Kasperson, Slovic, and a 
good many others including me, are trying to assess 
the social and economic impacts that may follow 
from its nomination as a possible location for a 
high-radiation-level nuclear waste repository. I am 
out of my own territory and I have not been able to 
spend any time investigating the customs and usages 
of yours. If I had not been asked to comment on 
“The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual 
Framework” you may rest assured I would not have 
said a word, and prudence might have suggested to 
me that I decline to do so in any event. It has been 
my experience, however, that children and strangers 
sometimes notice things that the locals and the 
grown-ups have forgotten or never noticed, and that 
sometimes their naive impressions are worth more 
expert consideration. Construe my remarks in such a 
light. 
I make the assumption that Kasperson et d ’ s  
essay, in pointing in the direction toward which they 
think risk analysis should move, also indicates, albeit 
in a very general and necessarily simplified way, the 
predominant orientation away from which they are 
moving. I commend the authors and whoever else 
among their colleagues joins them in attempting, by 
whatever methodology, to deal in increasingly ade- 
quate ways with the complexities of the human world. 
This is how I construe their general endeavor and my 
remarks are intended to abet it. 
It is, I think, of more than academic interest that 
the contrast, discussed by Kasperson et af.,  between 
“ traditional” risk analysis, which, I gather, confines 
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itself to assessments of the “probability of events 
and the magnitude of specific consequences” (ex- 
pressed as a product in the mathematical sense) on 
the one hand and, on the other, more comprehensive 
analyses taking into consideration “social amplifica- 
tion,” is an instance of the opposition between what 
Stephen Toulmin(’) calls “modern” and “ postmod- 
ern” science. In his terms, “modern science,” which 
was given its definitive shape by Descartes, is char- 
acterized by (1) an objectivity that radically separates 
the scientist from the system observed; (2) the divi- 
sion of knowledge and its pursuit into ever narrower 
disciplinary specializations, involving increasingly 
specialized methodologies; with the result that (3) 
little or no attention is paid to the integration of 
systems “as wholes” because systems as wholes are 
not in anyone’s particular bailiwick. In contrast, 
postmodern science, says Toulmin, (1) returns scien- 
tists to the systems from which Descartes alienated 
them but in which, nevertheless, they (along with the 
rest of humanity) are increasingly important actors; 
(2) must be increasingly concerned with the integra- 
tion of social-ecological systems; and (I would add) 
(3) therefore must be as concerned with information, 
meaning, and motive as with measurement and 
physical causation.(2) 
The distinction between modem and postmod- 
ern science is, then, illuminated by comparing risk 
assessment, a technical activity of experts, with risk 
perception, the recognition and interpretation of 
danger signals by participants in the systems that 
those experts study. The formal methods of risk 
assessment alienate the experts from those systems. 
Their methods aim to produce an objective result 
purporting to be a “true measure” of risk. I doubt if 
anyone claims that these formal methods resemble 
the ways in which people ordinarily recognize and 
assess risk, and, as I understand it, there is no 
place in the formal analysis of risk for native evalua- 
tion of risk. Experts may regard the latter as little 
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more than sources of error, which, unfortunately, the 
natives may prefer for irrational reasons to their 
own more accurate assessments. Postmodern risk 
analysis, taking the social-ecological system as a 
whole as its domain, would incorporate native per- 
ceptions into the analysis as more than external 
sources of misleading information. This is what I 
take Kasperson et al. to be attempting. 
The specific model of social amplification pre- 
sented by the authors seems to this foreigner a good 
and plausible approach to what will in all cases be 
extraordinarily complex processes, processes that in 
all cases will be in some respects unique. Every 
element of the model deserves lengthy and detailed 
discussion, which, I suspect, they will be receiving 
from now on. In the limited space available to me 
here I can only make a few general points. 
First, social and cultural processing of informa- 
tion is intrinsic to all transmissions concerning risk. 
There is no such thing as a pure, objective assess- 
ment, that is, one free of “social amplification” in 
the authors’ general sense. The most objective assess- 
ments, after all, are based upon the heuristics as- 
sumed valid by a particular scientific subculture. 
Such quantitative heuristics in their nature neces- 
sarily ignore, or at least deal only peripherally with, 
nonquantitative aspects of risk. 
Second, to generalize from the ubiquity of social 
amplification, social amplification in its general 
sense has its ground in the assumptions of the 
assessors. These assumptions are, in the main, cultur- 
ally established but tempered by individual experi- 
ence. There is room here for both anthropological 
and psychological input. These assumptions are, 
moreover, affected by such characteristics as 
economic status, political position, ethnicity, and 
education. Enter the rest of the social sciences. This 
may be obvious but should be emphasized. 
Third, it follows from the second point that 
social amplification does not commence with the 
transmission of alarm signals concerning risks al- 
ready perceived but with the recognition of the 
dangers in the first instance. 
Fourth, among the variables that will affect the 
attention paid to a message is the nature of the 
transmitter’s authority. Although it is easy to make 
gross discriminations about the differential “authori- 
tativeness” of authorities (e.g., a story about U.F.O. 
landings appearing in the New York Times would get 
more attention from most educated readers than one 
in The National Enquirer), much remains to be 
learned about this matter. 
Fifth, a secondary risk or “metarisk” that be- 
comes apparent in the consideration of social ampli- 
fication iss the risk for authorities themselves attending 
their assessment of risk and their transmission, amplifi- 
cation, dampening, or editing of alarm signals. They 
run the risk, if their transmissions are later shown to 
be erroneous or deliberately falsified, of being dis- 
credited. Much more serious than discrediting of 
particular authorities is the risk to the social system 
generally of loss of confidence in its own information 
processes-its basic values, meanings, and under- 
standings of the world, its trust in the probity not 
only of particular authorities but authority generally. 
There is, by the way, no real way to quantify conse- 
quences of this nature. 
Sixth, it should be kept in mind that, in the first 
instance, the criteria against which the results of a 
“ traditional” risk analysis (an objective calculation 
of the probability of an event and of the magnitude 
of its consequences) on the one hand, and a signal 
encoding the perceptions of members of a society on 
the other are to be assessed are very different. The 
criterion against which the results of a traditional 
risk analysis are to be assessed is accuracy (how you 
judge accuracy is another matter, of course). That is, 
we say it is a good analysis if we are persuaded that 
its numbers conform to “reality.” In contrast, the 
criteria against which danger signals attended to by 
members of endangered populations are to be as- 
sessed are adaptive. Does attention to the signal 
whether or not it is in a strict sense accurate, enhance 
well-being or survival? It is obvious that accuracy 
and adaptiveness are not coextensive categories. It is 
easy to imagine the adaptive value of amplification 
or exaggeration under some circumstances, the adap- 
tive value of playing down danger in others. In fact, 
some alarm signals-we can think here of many of 
those predicting environmental disaster-are adap- 
tive for the very reason that they help to induce 
actions that lead to their own falsification. There are 
self-falsifying as well as self-fulfilling prophecies. 
The fifth point above leads back to the general 
matter of postmodern science and its necessity. The 
movement from modem to postmodern science is 
crucial, says Toulmin, because both the complexity 
of the world and its coherence (the degree to whch 
its components are articulated) are increasing, largely 
as a consequence of technical, economic, and politi- 
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cal developments and also because the capacity of 
humans to transform the world for better or worse 
for increasingly trivial reasons of their own (e.g., to 
destroy the ozone layer in the service of propelling 
underarm deodorants with fluorocarbons) is also in- 
creasing. It may also be crucial in risk analysis-I 
leave risk analysts to decide-because traditional 
risk analysis may not be able to provide realistic 
assessments (products of probability and gravity of 
consequences) in more than a very limited class of 
cases. 
Although risk analysts may be able to calculate 
the probability of occurrence of a fairly broad range 
of events, their ability to predict and to calculate the 
magnitude or gravity of their consequences with any 
accuracy may be much more limited. For one thing, 
some consequences are not in their nature metrical, 
and attempts to develop metrics to indicate them 
really misrepresent them. I have already noted as an 
example that a possible cost of misrepresentation in 
the transmission of risk signals could be the corro- 
sion of the confidence of members of a society in 
their own institutions. This does seem to me to be a 
grave consequence and it also seems to me to be 
intrinsically nonmetrical. Nonmetrical examples be- 
yond number could be adduced. How, for instance, 
would anyone measure the gravity or magnitude of, 
let us say, the consequences of the development of 
mining in a previously economically undeveloped 
area in Papua New Guinea, as a function of which 
new wealth produced by wage labor became con- 
centrated in the hands of young men who had previ- 
ously been dependent upon older clansmen for mon- 
ey and valuables necessary to pay bride prices (still 
ubiquitous in that country and likely to remain so for 
decades or-I would not be surprised-even a cen- 
tury to come)? What is at stake here is not something 
metrical but something structural, namely, intergen- 
erational relations upon which cultural continuity 
has depended. Or consider the risks inherent in the 
granting of mining leases to a foreign corporation by 
those same tribesmen to extract gold through open 
pit methods. Some consequences are obviously metri- 
cal-the acres of garden land that simply disappear 
into a large hole, the production lost, the money 
paid, some of the environmental impacts. But other 
consequences include the commoditization of land 
that previously had not simply been owned, but to 
which connection had been mystical in a very pro- 
found sense. The Maring, a Papua New Guinea 
people among whom I have lived, assume that their 
first ancestors actually emerged from clan lands and 
that, therefore, they and their land are of one sub- 
stance. 
The consequences in all three of the hypothetical 
examples adduced lie in the realm of meaning and 
value. The human world, the world inhabited by 
humans, is not constituted by physical, chemical, and 
biological processes alone. It is also constituted cul- 
turally. As such it is not simply made of trees and 
rocks and water and organisms, but also furnished 
with and by such conceptions as truth, honor, de- 
mocracy, ancestors, and gods. These conceptions fig- 
ure as largely in the motives of individuals and in the 
ordering and governance of societies as do trees and 
rocks and life itself. Threats to them are not simply 
figments of ill-informed people who will use such 
understandings to resist the realistic calculations of 
dispassionate experts (although they may so use them). 
They are real. Their consideration may be beyond 
the scope of Kasperson et d ’ s  initial program but 
not beyond the possibilities of the postmodern risk 
analysis toward which they point. 
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